Our research stack: 5 IETF drafts behind DPA Cloud's security architecture
Most MSPs buy their security stack off the shelf. We built ours, and we've been publishing the architecture as Independent Stream research through the IETF. All five are in active production use internally — the public drafts are the simplified version of what's actually running.
1. Invariant-Closed System Design (ICSD) — draft-dpa-icsd
The core principle behind everything we build for compliance-critical clients: instead of detecting and remediating invalid or non-compliant states after they happen, ICSD constrains the system so invalid states can't be represented at all. For payroll, tax, financial reporting, and regulated infrastructure, this means compliance isn't a checklist bolted on afterward — it's structurally guaranteed by the data model itself.
2. Universal Zero-Port Interconnect Framework (UZPIF) — draft-dpa-uzpif-framework
A post-port networking model. Endpoints never open a publicly reachable listening port — instead they establish outbound, identity-bound sessions to Rendezvous Nodes. No open port means no port for an attacker or a scanner to find in the first place. This is the foundation of the "reduced attack surface" work we roll into managed infrastructure.
3. Universal Zero-Port Transport Protocol (UZP) — draft-dpa-uzp-transport
The transport layer under UZPIF. Identity-addressed, encrypted by default, with a handshake built on modern and post-quantum-capable primitives. Rendezvous Nodes stitch flows together but never terminate the end-to-end encryption or hold long-term secrets — so no single intermediary is a point of compromise.
4. TLS-DPA — draft-dpa-tls-dpa
A TLS 1.3-inspired handshake generalized to work where IP:port semantics don't apply. Authentication binds to Service Identities instead of network coordinates, metadata exposure to intermediaries is reduced, and it includes a hybrid-KEM post-quantum transition path — so clients aren't stuck re-architecting when PQC becomes mandatory.
5. Outbound Indexing — draft-dpa-uzpif-outbound-indexing
An opt-in alternative to traditional inbound crawling (the Robots Exclusion Protocol model). Servers proactively initiate authenticated outbound connections to trusted indexers — search engines or AI systems — with explicit consent grants for indexing and content usage. Less unsolicited crawling, better signal quality, and consent baked in at the protocol level rather than an honor-system text file.
Why this matters if you're evaluating us as an MSP: the same GDPR/compliance discipline we bring to backup audits (see our earlier post) is the same discipline behind this stack — invalid or non-compliant states get engineered out, not caught after the fact. Happy to go deeper on any of these in the comments.
